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U.K. REFUGEE LAWYERS: PUSHING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF DOMESTIC COURT 
ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL  
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Stephen Meili* 
Abstract: This Article analyzes how refugee lawyers in the United King-
dom navigate the tension between state power and international norms. 
Based on interviews with lawyers representing persons seeking asylum and 
other forms of refugee protection in the United Kingdom, the Article re-
veals how these lawyers successfully utilize international human rights 
treaties on behalf of their clients despite domestic policies making it more 
difficult for refugees to assert their rights. The Article argues that U.K. 
refugee lawyers play a critical role in the globalization struggle by encour-
aging state actors (in this case, the judiciary) to adhere to international 
norms that might otherwise go ignored in an anti-immigrant political 
climate. In so doing, these lawyers have helped to broaden the sources on 
which state power over immigration is based. The Article thus contributes 
to the literature on the devolution of state power in an era of globaliza-
tion, as well as cause lawyering. 
Introduction 
 Over the past two decades, international law in many parts of the 
world has been moving in a less state-centric direction and more toward 
universal protection of human rights through, for example, the creation 
of the International Criminal Court, the emergence of universal juris-
diction (e.g., the Pinochet case), and international ad hoc tribunals (e.g., 
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia).1 At the same time, the world has witnessed 
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1 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 1, 2002, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90; R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (No. 3) (Pinochet III ), [2000] 1 
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the erosion of state sovereignty as the chief organizing principle of in-
ternational relations.2 Much as globalization of commerce has changed 
the international marketplace, globalization of human rights law has 
changed the way many countries treat non-citizens within their borders.3 
 Asylum law vividly illustrates the way that globalization creates ten-
sion between state power and international norms.4 On the one hand, 
the global migration of people seeking relief from persecution has— 
through international treaties like the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees5—created international legal norms that supplant 
state power to decide who shall remain within a country and who shall 
be removed or excluded.6 On the other hand, states have continually 
attempted to reassert power over their borders by enacting stricter im-
migration controls.7 This struggle has become more acute over the past 
fifteen years in many refugee-receiving nations, the product of a gen-
eral anti-immigrant sentiment exacerbated by security concerns stem-
ming from the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, 
the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the July 2005 London 
Underground bombings.8 This conflict has been particularly acute in 
the United Kingdom, as a result of policies initially implemented by the 
Labor Government of then-Prime Minister Tony Blair to severely limit 
the number of persons seeking, and ultimately being granted, asylum.9 
These policies have included making it more difficult for potential asy-
                                                                                                                      
A.C. 147 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 
8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
2 See James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in Governance 
Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics 1, 4 ( James N. Rosenau 
& Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992). 
3 See Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the Pos-
sibilities of Cause Lawyering, in Cause Lawyering and the State in a Global Era 3, 5–12 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001). 
4 See, e.g., Richard Maiman, Asylum Law Practice in the United Kingdom After the Human 
Rights Act, in The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure and Agency in Legal 
Practice 410, 411–13 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005) (discussing the evolu-
tion of asylum law in the United Kingdom and noting its incompatibility with portions of 
the European Convention on Human Rights). 
5 See generally Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
6 Id. arts. 35–36. 
7 See Vincent Chetail, Freedom of Movement and Transnational Migrations: A Human Rights 
Perspective, in Migration and International Legal Norms 47, 47 (T. Alexander Al-
einikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., 2003) (“[C]ontrol over migration remains one of the last 
bastions of the truly sovereign state.”). 
8 See James Hampshire, Immigration Policy in the United Kingdom, Migration Citizen-
ship Educ., http://www.migrationeducation.org/49.0.html (last visited May 9, 2013). 
9 See Maiman, supra note 4, at 412–14. 
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lum-seekers to reach British territory in the first place, deporting un-
successful applicants more expeditiously, and cutting legal aid funding 
that had previously supported the work of refugee lawyers.10 
 This Article explores the ways that lawyers representing asylum-
seekers in the United Kingdom navigate the space between a dimin-
ished yet still formidable state authority over refugee status and the 
continuing emergence of international norms that pose a threat to 
such authority. The United Kingdom is a fascinating site to explore this 
question because, by effectively incorporating the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR)11 into its domestic law in 1998,12 and 
agreeing to asylum procedures common to all European countries 
through the European Union (EU) Qualification Directive of 2004,13 
the United Kingdom consciously ceded significant control over refugee 
determinations to international norms.14 Moreover, in 2011 the Su-
preme Court of the United Kingdom relied on the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child15 (which has not been formally incorporated into 
British law) in holding that the best interests of the child must be a 
primary concern in any deportation case that might result in the sepa-
ration of a child from his or her parents.16 
 These legislative and judicial developments have allowed U.K. refu-
gee lawyers to simultaneously invoke international human rights norms 
while remaining within the bounds of domestic precedent.17 As a result, 
these lawyers play a critical role in shaping state power over refugee mat-
ters in the wake of globalization.18 By pushing for the expanded applica-
                                                                                                                      
10 See id. 
11 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
12 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 1 (U.K.). 
13 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and 
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who 
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, 
2004 O.J. (L 304) 12. 
14 Human Rights Act § 2. 
15 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
CRC]. 
16 ZH (Tanzania) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2011] UKSC 4, [23]–[26] (ap-
peal taken from Eng.). The decision in ZH (Tanzania) was based in part on section 55 of 
the U.K. Borders, Citizenship, and Immigration Act of 2009, which provides in relevant 
part that in relation to matters of immigration, asylum, or nationality, the Secretary of 
State’s duties must be “discharged [with] regard to the need to safeguard and promote the 
welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom.” Borders, Citizenship, and Immigra-
tion Act, 2009, c. 11, § 55 (U.K.). 
17 Maiman, supra note 4, at 414–15. 
18 See id. 
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tion of international human rights treaties to individual asylum cases, 
refugee lawyers force judges to address the persuasiveness of these in-
ternational arguments and, at least in some cases, accept them.19 Due 
largely to such pressure, the role of international human rights norms 
in U.K. asylum adjudications has expanded significantly over the past 
decade.20 
 This Article begins with a discussion of the two theoretical founda-
tions that frame its analysis. It then outlines the empirical methodology 
on which its findings are based. Next, it describes and analyzes the data, 
and ends with a set of conclusions concerning the role of U.K. refugee 
lawyers in the ongoing struggle over the proper role for international 
human rights norms in domestic law. 
I. Theoretical Frames 
 Two interrelated areas of socio-legal scholarship set the theoretical 
frame for this Article: the diminution of state power in an era of global-
ization and cause lawyering in a global context. Each is described in 
more detail below. 
A. Diminution of State Power in an Era of Globalization 
 The rise of globalization has caused a realignment of norms guid-
ing state conduct.21 Competition between different legal standards has 
intensified.22 Typical spheres of power, predominantly state regulatory 
regimes, have seen their influence decline.23 The resulting power vac-
uum has been filled by a loose configuration of private-sector and in-
ternational organizations, both profit-making and non-profit, operating 
outside the confines of typical government regulation.24 Power now 
flows from foreign investment, liberal trade, and economic spheres 
such as central banking systems.25 This has caused state regulatory re-
gimes to further deteriorate as economic growth is no longer within 
their control.26 
                                                                                                                      
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 8–10 (2004). 
22 See Pheng Cheah, Posit(ion)ing Human Rights in the Current Global Conjecture, 9 Pub. 
Culture 233, 252–53 (1997). 
23 See Slaughter, supra note 21, at 262. 
24 Id. 
25 David Goldblatt et al., Economic Globalization and the Nation-State: Shifting Balances of 
Power, 22 Alternatives 269, 281 (1997). 
26 Id. 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1127 
 The literature on globalization identifies numerous ways in which 
states have ceded their policymaking powers to international economic 
pressures.27 For example, in an effort to promote economic stability 
(and thereby to create more opportunity for trade and investment), 
many states have taken steps to reduce social programs and thus reduce 
taxes.28 Similarly, the rise of multinational corporations (MNCs) has led 
to a focus on international economics causing a reduction of state poli-
cymaking powers.29 MNCs are able to quickly shift labor and resources 
to take advantage of favorable labor and investment conditions.30 States 
surrender policymaking to MNCs in order to capitalize on their eco-
nomic benefits.31 Finally, the emergence of transnational regulatory 
networks (TRNs), fora involving multiple nations’ regulators, has fur-
ther contributed to diminished policymaking powers of the state.32 Ac-
cording to some scholars, TRNs are better equipped to deal with the 
challenges of globalization because they are relatively unconstrained by 
the political and jurisdictional pressures that constrict effective reform 
at the state level.33 
 This Article adds to the literature on globalization by arguing that 
refugee lawyers in the United Kingdom wield significant influence in 
the ongoing struggle between international human rights norms and 
state power over migration. Unlike other areas of regulatory authority 
where states have surrendered to global market forces for economic 
benefit, the acceptance of international human rights norms by state 
actors has been more contentious.34 For example, while most countries 
have ratified numerous human rights treaties, many states parties rou-
tinely ignore or actively violate them in practice.35 Moreover, while 
some state actors (primarily within the judiciary) have embraced inter-
                                                                                                                      
27 See Slaughter, supra note 21, at 262; Maiman, supra note 4, at 414–15; Rosenau, su-
pra note 2, at 8–9. 
28 See Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State 190, 192 (1998). 
29 See Goldblatt et al., supra note 25, at 277–80. 
30 David Held, Rethinking Democracy: Globalization and Democratic Theory, in Interna-
tionale Wirtschaft, Nationale Demokratie 59, 66 (Wolfgang Streeck ed., 1998). 
31 See id. 
32 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 113, 118–19 (2009). TRNs are “informal multilateral forums that bring together 
representatives from national regulatory agencies or departments to facilitate multilateral 
cooperation on issues of mutual interest within the authority of the participants.” Id. at 118. 
33 Slaughter, supra note 21, at 167. Others see fewer benefits to TRNs. See Verdier, su-
pra note 32, at 128–29. 
34 See Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in 
Domestic Politics 273 (2009); Oona Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the International 
Law of Torture, in Torture: A Collection 199, 202–03 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). 
35 Simmons, supra note 34, at 273; Hathaway, supra note 34, at 202–03. 
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national human rights norms in determining eligibility for refugee sta-
tus,36 others (primarily within the legislative and executive branches) 
have adopted measures to lessen the impact of such determinations.37 
The ongoing struggle between these forces has created an opening for 
refugee lawyers to push for increased acceptance of international hu-
man rights norms in asylum adjudications.38 As a result, these norms 
have significantly modified state power over migration in the United 
Kingdom during the past decade.39 
B. Cause Lawyering in an Era of Globalization 
 Cause lawyering scholarship examines lawyers who consciously 
seek social or political goals while simultaneously pursuing the interests 
of their individual clients.40 While much of this scholarship focuses on 
cause lawyering in a comparative context (i.e., studying cause lawyering 
sites in various countries and regions, and the ways in which cause law-
yers both serve and respond to the forces of globalization),41 little of it 
deals with the application of international norms in domestic courts.42 
This Article begins to fill that gap by focusing on ways that U.K. refugee 
lawyers utilize international human rights norms when advocating on 
behalf of their clients in an era when many U.K. governmental policies 
seek to restrict the rights of non-citizens. 
 One of the core tenets of cause lawyering literature is that such 
lawyering thrives when a “confident” government promotes social jus-
tice initiatives, but is frustrated when a “frightened” government strug-
gles to retain power.43 This Article refines the latter of these premises in 
the international human rights context, demonstrating that after over a 
decade of what many would term drastic measures by the U.K. govern-
ment to reassert power over its national borders, U.K. cause lawyers 
practicing refugee law are, if not thriving, certainly finding success in 
                                                                                                                      
36 See ZH (Tanzania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [24]. 
37 See Maiman, supra note 4, at 411–13. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 416–20. 
40 Stuart A. Scheingold & Austin Sarat, Something to Believe in: Politics, 
Professionalism, and Cause Lawyering 3 (2005). 
41 Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
42 But see Maiman, supra note 4, at 410–24 (studying U.K. refugee lawyers shortly after 
implementation of the Human Rights Act, which incorporated the ECHR into British do-
mestic law). 
43 Richard Abel, Speaking Truth to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in Cause Law-
yering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities 69, 103 (Austin 
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). 
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expanding the protections available to their clients. These findings 
suggest that a modification of the tenet is warranted when a state’s con-
stricting domestic measures are countered by cause lawyers’ innovative 
and persistent use of international norms to which the state has agreed, 
at least in principle, to abide. The state can surely frustrate the efforts 
of cause lawyers by clamping down on internal forces seeking social 
change, but when those forces are global norms which the state has 
agreed to uphold, it is more difficult for the state to consistently resist 
the efforts of cause lawyers to enforce them. 
II. Methodology 
 The data collected for this Article was obtained through interviews 
with forty-two U.K. solicitors and barristers between September 2010 
and May 2013. All interviewees are lawyers who have regularly repre-
sented asylum-seekers and/or the government in asylum cases for at 
least three years. Key informants helped identify lawyers who fit these 
criteria for interviewing. 
 This qualitative approach seeks to understand the influence and 
effectiveness of international human rights law from the lawyers’ own 
points of view, in their full complexity rather than in their distributional 
frequency. The method is therefore inductive and consists of semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions that focus on a set of 
key themes: whether the lawyers regularly invoke international human 
rights treaties in their asylum practice, under what circumstances they 
do so, and whether they feel that such law has an impact—be it positive 
or negative—on the outcomes of their cases. Because the study exam-
ines the key perceptions of cause lawyers about the impact of interna-
tional human rights law on refugee law and practice in domestic courts, 
interviewing at least forty-two lawyers in the United Kingdom is suffi-
cient to reach thematic saturation: the point at which no new themes 
emerge.44 
 The interviews proceeded as follows: Each lawyer was first asked to 
describe, in general terms, a recent asylum case that he or she argued 
in front of an administrative tribunal or appellate court. Depending on 
the depth of the response, the lawyer was asked follow-up questions re-
garding the particular facts of the case and the nature of the key legal 
arguments made to the judge. If the lawyer mentioned an international 
human rights treaty spontaneously during the initial response, they 
                                                                                                                      
44 Greg Guest et al., How Many Interviews Are Enough?: An Experiment with Data Satura-
tion and Variability, 18 Field Methods 59, 64–65 (2006). 
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were asked how and why they used it in that case and whether they 
thought it had any impact on the result—and if so, why. The lawyers 
were then asked more general questions about the frequency with 
which they explicitly reference international human rights law in their 
advocacy. If a lawyer failed to mention any international human rights 
treaty during the initial response, he or she was asked whether such 
treaties came up in the course of a case, and why or why not. Lawyers 
were also asked the more general question of how frequently they ex-
plicitly refer to human rights law in asylum cases. 
III. Overview of the U.K. Asylum Adjudication Process 
 The United Kingdom is a signatory to the 1951 Convention relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees45 (Refugee Convention) and thus is obli-
gated to grant refugee status to those who can demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.46 The decision 
whether to grant asylum in the United Kingdom is a hybrid administra-
tive and judicial process.47 An initial determination is made by the U.K. 
Border Agency (Border Agency), which is part of the Home Office, a 
governmental department focused on immigration, counterterrorism, 
drugs, and crime.48 If the claim is rejected by the Border Agency, the 
claimant may appeal the denial to the Immigration and Asylum Tribu-
nal (Tribunal), an administrative body that makes its own findings of 
                                                                                                                      
45 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, pmbl. n.1. 
46 Id. art. 1; see Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267 (removing the effect of the time limitation on the definition of “refugee” in 
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, United 
Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en (last visited May 9, 2013) (showing the United King-
dom as a party to the 1967 Protocol). 
47 There are three different claims an asylum-seeker can make in attempting to remain 
in the United Kingdom: an asylum claim under the Refugee Convention, a claim for hu-
manitarian protection under complementary protection principles that fall outside the 
Refugee Convention, and a “human rights claim” under the ECHR/Human Rights Act. 
Maria O’Sullivan, The Intersection Between the International, the Regional and the Domestic: Seek-
ing Asylum in the U.K., in Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law 228, 251 (Su-
san Kneebone ed., 2009); see Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in Interna-
tional Refugee Law 1–2 (2007). As a practical matter, in each individual case, the Home 
Office considers all three of these bases for protection, regardless of which one(s) the 
claimant actually raises. O’Sullivan, supra, at 251. Therefore, for purposes of this Article, all 
three of these claims will be designated as claims for asylum. 
48 The Asylum Process, UK Border Agency, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/ 
process/ (last visited May 9, 2013). 
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fact.49 The Tribunal, comprised of approximately seven hundred judg-
es, is divided into two levels: the First Tier initially hears the appeal and 
its decision can be appealed to the Upper Tribunal.50 If claimants are 
unsuccessful at the Tribunal level, they may appeal to the Court of Ap-
peal, and ultimately to the Supreme Court.51 Judicial review is not a 
right, and appeals beyond the Tribunal (that is, to the court) are lim-
ited to errors of law.52 
IV. The Role of International Human Rights Law  
in U.K. Asylum Adjudication 
 Prior to 2000, the only international human rights instrument rel-
evant to asylum jurisprudence was the Refugee Convention, which es-
tablished the right to seek asylum.53 The United Kingdom ratified the 
Refugee Convention in 1954 but did not incorporate it into domestic 
law until 1993.54 The Refugee Convention limits asylum to those who 
can demonstrate that if they are forced to return to their home country 
they will be persecuted on the basis of one of the five Convention 
grounds enumerated above.55 Accordingly, the Refugee Convention 
                                                                                                                      
49 Robert Thomas, Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tri-
bunal Adjudication 61–62 (2011); O’Sullivan, supra note 47, at 252–53. 
50 Mark Symes & Peter Jorro, Asylum Law and Practice 875 (2010); Robert Tho-
mas, Refugee Roulette: A U.K. Perspective, in Refugee Roulette 164, 164–65 ( Jaya Ramji-
Nogales et al. eds., 2009). While Tribunal judges—who are sometimes practicing refugee 
lawyers—are required to issue written decisions, the Upper Tribunal only publishes those 
decisions which it deems to have value as legal precedent or in describing conditions with-
in a country relevant to the issue of whether an asylum-seeker’s forced return would vio-
late the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law. Symes & Jorro, supra, at 
1078–80. Although precise statistics are unavailable, one lawyer estimated that ten percent 
of Tribunal decisions are published. Interview with Interviewee UK-106, in London, Eng. 
(Sep. 10, 2012). 
51 Symes & Jorro, supra note 50, at 1112–14; Chapter 27 – Judicial Review, UK Border 
Agency, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/IDIs/ 
idischapter27/ (last updated Apr. 25, 2013) (follow “Section 3 – Judicial review process” hyper 
link; then scroll down to pages 2–3 of the linked document). 
52 See generally Symes & Jorro, supra note 50, at 1035–1112 (discussing eligibility for 
and procedure of appeal beyond the Tribunal). 
53 See Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1. 
54 See Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, c. 23, § 2 (U.K.). According to sec-
tion 2 of the Act, which is entitled “Primacy of Convention,” “[n]othing in the immigra-
tion rules . . . shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the [Refugee] Con-
vention.” See id. Moreover, in section 1 of the Act, “claim for asylum” is defined as “a claim 
made by a person . . . that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under 
the [Refugee] Convention for him to be removed from, or required to leave, the United 
Kingdom.” Id. § 1. 
55 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(A)(2). 
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does not protect those likely to suffer harm for other reasons, such as 
generalized violence throughout their home country.56 It also does not 
protect children likely to be harmed if their parents are deported fol-
lowing an unsuccessful asylum claim.57 
 As a result of these limitations, lawyers representing refugees in the 
United Kingdom prior to 2000 faced a significant challenge.58 Without 
a bill of rights or similar document within domestic law, and facing ju-
dicial reluctance to rely on any international law other than the Refu-
gee Convention, their advocacy options were extremely limited.59 As 
one lawyer practicing in this area for over a decade stated: “If you had 
gone to an immigration tribunal pre-2000 and tried to bring up the 
[ECHR], they would have looked at you like you were wasting their 
time.”60 Another lawyer explained that before the ECHR became part 
of U.K. domestic law, judges relied exclusively on the common law in 
deciding asylum claims. “[T]here were two schools of thought [both of 
which] felt that our common law was capable of delivering the same 
principles without tying us down to a particular treaty.”61 
 All of that changed in 2000, when the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
became effective in England.62 The HRA effectively incorporated the 
ECHR,63 which the United Kingdom had ratified in 1951, but had not 
previously incorporated into domestic law.64 The HRA gave judges 
something they had previously lacked in a legal system without a consti-
tutional provision for judicial review: the ability to overrule human 
rights-related decisions by the legislative and executive branches of 
government.65 It also provided practitioners with a broader basis for 
                                                                                                                      
56 See id. 
57 See Symes & Jorro, supra note 50, at 432–33. 
58 See O’Sullivan, supra note 47, 236–39 (characterizing the legislation proliferated by 
the United Kingdom from 1993–2002 as obscure, complex, and technical). 
59 See Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50; Interview with Interviewee UK-
105, in London, Eng. (Sep. 10, 2012). 
60 Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50. 
61 Interview with Interviewee UK-105, supra note 59. 
62 The HRA was enacted in 1998 and went into effect in Scotland in July 1999, and 
Wales and England in October 2000. Maiman, supra note 4, at 410. 
63 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42. The “Introductory Text” of the HRA states, in 
relevant part, that it is “[a]n Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed 
under the [ECHR].” Id. Section 3(1) of the HRA provides that “[s]o far as it is possible to 
do so . . . legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with 
[ECHR] rights.” Id. § 3(1). Section 6(1) of the HRA provides that “[i]t is unlawful for a 
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a[n] [ECHR] right[].” Id. 
§ 6(1). Schedule 1 of the HRA consists of the operative provisions of the ECHR. Id. sch.1. 
64 See id. § 1. 
65 Maiman, supra note 4, at 411. 
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affording their clients protection.66 While a particular applicant might 
not be able to establish persecution on one of the grounds enumerated 
in the Refugee Convention, if the applicant could show a likelihood of 
ill treatment upon returning to his or her home country for other rea-
sons, the applicant would be likely to receive protection under the 
ECHR, and thus the HRA.67 
 While neither the HRA nor the ECHR concern asylum or refugee 
matters per se, lawyers representing asylum-seekers have invoked sev-
eral ECHR provisions in defense of their clients.68 For example, Article 
3 of the ECHR prohibits, without exception, torture and “inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”69 Accordingly, Article 3 is rele-
vant to most asylum claims, as the majority of asylum applicants assert 
that they will be physically harmed if forced to return to their home 
country.70 Article 8 provides for the right to respect for one’s private 
and family life, home, and correspondence.71 It is often invoked in cas-
es where return to the applicant’s country of origin will disrupt the pri-
vate and/or family life developed since arriving in the United King-
dom.72 These provisions, as well as others within the ECHR, offer 
broader protection to asylum-seekers than does the Refugee Conven-
tion, which requires significant evidence of projected harm in a narrow 
range of situations.73 Moreover, the Refugee Convention also requires a 
demonstration that the harm likely to be suffered is because of one of 
the five enumerated reasons.74 The ECHR’s protections contain no 
such requirement.75 
 As a result, it has now become accepted, if not required, practice 
for U.K. refugee lawyers to invoke the ECHR.76 Statements from law-
yers interviewed for this Article support this notion. One, for example, 
said: 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. at 416–17. 
67 See id. 
68 See Interview with Interviewee UK-108, in London, Eng. (Sep. 17, 2012). 
69 ECHR, supra note 11, art. 3. 
70 See, e.g., Maiman, supra note 4, at 417 (describing application of the ECHR and the 
HRA to allegations of physical abuse). 
71 ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8. 
72 See Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68. 
73 See ECHR, supra note 11, arts. 3, 8; Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1. 
74 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1. 
75 See generally ECHR, supra note 11 (containing no enumeration of causes of harm). 
76 See Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50; Interview with Interviewee UK-
108, supra note 68. 
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I would never not run [the ECHR] . . . . [Y]ou don’t have to 
prove the particular Refugee Convention grounds . . . . [I]t is 
incredibly rare to run a case without raising Article 8 as well. 
Article 8 ECHR is sort of par for the course. You always run a 
re I haven’t relied on the Refugee Convention and the 
uments, any former 
sis
views, however, suggest that the 
EHCR has now become the kind of precedential statutory authority on 
which the 
borders.84 The catalyst for these procedures was the alleged abuse of 
                                                                                                                     
private life claim if they’ve been here for anything above a 
year.77 
Another agreed, saying, “I can hardly think of any . . . asylum case I’ve 
done whe
[ECHR]. It’s just absolutely standard. That’s what your arguments are 
about.”78 
 Indeed, most of the lawyers interviewed suggested that it might 
border on malpractice to not invoke the ECHR in a particular case.79 
They indicated that judges expect to hear such arg
re tance to them having been erased by the fact that the ECHR is “en-
shrined” in U.K. domestic law through the HRA.80 
 These attitudes reflect a dramatic, and very recent, change in atti-
tudes among lawyers about the acceptance of ECHR-based arguments. 
For example, a 2005 study of the attitudes of U.K. refugee lawyers not-
ed that “asylum lawyers were struggling to use the HRA . . . to improve 
their clients’ prospects.”81 Furthermore, as recently as 2010, one of the 
lawyers interviewed said that judges see HRA-based arguments as a sign 
of desperation.82 More current inter
British judiciary depends.83 
V. Efforts to Reassert State Authority over  
the Asylum Process 
 At the same time that the U.K. judiciary was beginning to accept 
international norms beyond the Refugee Convention in evaluating asy-
lum claims, the other branches of government were adopting proce-
dures to limit the number of asylum-seekers and refugees within U.K. 
 
77 Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68. 
78 Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
81 Maiman, supra note 4, at 422. 
82 Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-104 (Sep. 16, 2010). 
83 See Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50; Interview with Interviewee UK-
108, supra note 68. 
84 See O’Sullivan, supra note 47, at 233–34. 
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the asylum system by migrants perceived as seeking economic prosper-
ity rather than relief from persecution.85 This perceived abuse became 
a hot-button political issue in the late 1990s, seized upon by the tabloid 
media as well as opposition politicians.86 While toned down somewhat 
in recent years, it has led to a culture of skepticism toward asylum-
seekers among the public and the judiciary. As one lawyer described 
the situation: “The political . . . background is absolutely rabid . . . . Asy-
lum-seeker and refugee has become a dirty word. It is absolutely awful 
and shocking . . . [T]he counterargument is that there is abuse. Well, 
there is abuse in every single system where we have a presumption of 
no
oughout the 
un
                                                                                                                     
in cence.”87 
 As a result of public outcry against alleged abuse, and an attempt 
to fend off charges from the Conservative Party and the media that it 
was “soft” on asylum, the newly installed Labour government of Tony 
Blair pledged to drastically reduce the number of asylum-seekers, cul-
minating in the 2005 “tipping the balance target” proposal that it would 
remove more asylum applicants per month than the number who ap-
ply.88 These efforts were aided by the United Kingdom’s enforcement 
of the Dublin Convention of 1990, which permits any EU Member 
State to transfer an asylum applicant to the EU Member State where 
the applicant first entered without documentation.89 As a result, the 
deportation of asylum-seekers as a percentage of all removed immi-
grants in the United Kingdom rose from 6.4% in 1993 to 25.6% in 
2006.90 The government also made life more difficult for those asylum-
seekers who were not removed by dispersing them thr
co try and limiting their eligibility for welfare benefits.91 
 In addition to removing asylum-seekers already in the country, the 
government adopted a number of policies during the first decade of the 
 
85 See id. at 233 n.29. 
86 Id. 
87 Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-111 (Oct. 18, 2012). 
88 Matthew Gibney, Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom, 43 
Gov’t & Opposition 146, 157 (2008). 
89 Symes & Jorro, supra note 50, at 475–76. Given that many asylum-seekers in the 
United Kingdom first entered the EU through another country (typically in southern or 
eastern Europe), the United Kingdom was able to remove many asylum-seekers without 
adjudicating their claims. See id. at 476–78. 
90 See Scott Blinder, The Migration Observatory at the Univ. of Oxford, Brief-
ing: Deportations, Removals and Voluntary Departures from the UK 5–6 figs.2 & 3 
(2012), available at http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Briefing- 
Deportations.pdf (calculated from graphs noting the number total deportations and depor-
tations by subtype). 
91 Gibney, supra note 88, at 157. 
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twenty-first century making it more difficult for asylum-seekers to reach 
the United Kingdom in the first place.92 These policies included tighter 
control over documents, increased scrutiny of persons attempting to 
travel to the United Kingdom via air and rail, increased fines for airlines 
and truck drivers who transport undocumented persons to the country, 
and reduction of available points of entry.93 Like the concerted effort to 
remove asylum applicants, these measures had their intended impact: 
the number of asylum applicants in the United Kingdom fell by over 
fty 
 the rules governing adjudica-
n
services to immigrants, including asylum-seekers, receive some form of 
                                                                                                                     
fi percent between 2002 and 2010, from 103,000 to 41,000.94 
 The U.K. government has also made it more difficult to obtain 
refugee status by frequently changing the rules governing the asylum 
process.95 As a result, a series of legislative initiatives over the past dec-
ade have resulted in restricted appeal rights and other procedural bar-
riers to effective asylum claims.96 Most recently, in July 2012, the Home 
Secretary proposed restrictive changes to
tio  of cases under ECHR Article 8.97 
 The final and perhaps most significant governmental measure 
making asylum less attainable are cutbacks in legal aid funding. The 
legal aid system in the United Kingdom began in 1949 and provides 
legal services to lower-income persons in a variety of areas, including 
immigration law.98 Approximately thirty percent of all adults in the 
United Kingdom qualify for legal aid.99 Most lawyers who provide legal 
 
92 See, e.g., Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act, 2004, c. 19, 
§ 17 (U.K.); Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act, 2002, c. 41 (U.K.); Immigration 
and Asylum Act, 1999, c. 33, §§ 18, 32 (U.K.). 
93 See Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act § 17; Immigration 
and Asylum Act §§ 18, 32. 
94 Compare United Nations High Comm’r on Refugees, Statistical Yearbook 2010, 
at 88 tbl.9 (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ef9c7269.html, with United Nations 
High Comm’r on Refugees, Statistical Yearbook 2002 annex tbls.C.1, C.7 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.unhcr.org/413598454.html. 
95 See O’Sullivan, supra note 47, at 236–39. 
96 Id. at 237–38. 
97 See Home Department, Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, 2012, 
H.C. 194 passim (U.K.). The proposed changes require Tribunal judges to balance a claim-
ant’s assertion of family rights under Article 8 with considerations that include the claim-
ant’s criminal history and whether there are any insurmountable obstacles to the con-
tinuation of the claimant’s family life outside the United Kingdom. Id. at 4. The rules were 
challenged with mixed success in a recent Upper Tribunal case. See MF (Nigeria) v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t, [2012] UKUT 00393 (IAC). 
98 Jon Robins, Legal Aid in 21st-Century Britain, Guardian (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/money/2009/mar/11/legal-aid-justice-gap. 
99 See id. 
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financial remuneration from legal aid.100 As numerous scholars have 
noted, asylum-seekers generally have a much better chance of success 
when they are represented by counsel.101 According to one lawyer in-
terviewed for this Article: “One thing is absolutely right . . . that the way 
our . . . asylum determination system is set up is contingent upon appli-
cants having good quality legal advice and representation.”102 
 The Cameron government, in its efforts to reduce budget deficits, 
has taken steps to substantially cut legal aid.103 A previous round of cuts 
to the reimbursement rate and increased delay in the distribution of 
reimbursements to lawyers contributed to the closing of Refugee and 
Migrant Justice, and the Immigration Advisory Service, two prominent 
organizations that provided legal assistance to large numbers of refu-
gees and other immigrants.104 The latest round of cuts, implemented in 
April 2013, completely eliminate legal aid funding for a variety of immi-
gration-related matters, including applications to remain in the United 
Kingdom under Article 8 of the ECHR.105 And while funding will still be 
available for asylum-seekers, the reimbursement rate for such work will 
be further reduced.106 
 Lawyers in the interview sample (including those who represent 
the government) have described the cuts as “drastic,” “devastating,” 
and likely to have an “enormous” impact on persons seeking refuge 
                                                                                                                      
100 Owen Bowcott, Tens of Thousands Lose Support as Immigration Advisory Service Closes, 
Guardian (July 11, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/jul/11/immigration-advis 
ory-service-closes-blames-government; Migrant Charity in Administration Amid Cash Problems, 
BBC News (June 15, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10324774. 
101 Although there have been no empirical studies in the United Kingdom of the cor-
relation between representation by counsel and successful asylum claims, a significant 
correlation between those factors has been identified in both the United States and Can-
ada. Sean Rehaag, The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System: An Empirical 
Assessment, 49 Osgoode Hall L.J. 71–116 (2011); see Jon B. Gould et al., A Refugee from 
Justice? Disparate Treatment in the Federal Court of Canada, 32 Law & Pol. 454, 457–58 (2010); 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Immigration Courts, in Refugee Roulette, supra note 50, at 33, 
45. 
102 Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-101 (Sep. 8, 2010). 
103 Cf. Memorandum from Steve Symonds, Legal Officer, Immigr. L. Prac. Ass’n, Updates 
to Cuts/Changes to Legal Aid for Immigration Advice (May 15, 2012), available at http:// 
www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/14725/12.17.05-Ealing-Advice-Forum-re-Legal-Aid.pdf (de-
tailing reduced legal aid services for immigration and asylum issues). 
104 See Bowcott, supra note 100; Migrant Charity in Administration Amid Cash Problems, su-
pra note 100. 
105 See Memorandum from Steve Symonds, supra note 103; see also Patrick Hennessy, Legal 
Aid Curb for Foreign Migrants, Telegraph (London), Apr. 6, 2013, http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/news/politics/9976786/Legal-aid-curb-for-foreign-migrants.html. 
106 See Memorandum from Steve Symonds, supra note 103. 
1138 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
from persecution.107 Interviewees cited several reasons for these grim 
assessments. The most common response was that the cuts will reduce 
the number of lawyers representing asylum-seekers because most law-
yers currently doing so offer additional advice to immigrants that will 
no longer be funded through legal aid.108 As a result, many of these 
lawyers are likely to leave the immigration field entirely. As one lawyer 
succinctly put it: “We’re all very worried that the good [solicitor] firms 
. . . will go under . . . . There’s only so much pro bono you can do.”109 
 Another consistently-cited concern was that people with otherwise 
valid claims under Article 8 will be returned to their home countries.110 
As one lawyer put it: “I’m sure that every day dozens of people will be 
removed from the United Kingdom who, were their [Article 8] case 
dealt with properly, would have succeeded in demonstrating that it was 
not proportionate to remove them.”111 
 In addition to these oft-cited effects, a few lawyers articulated oth-
er, less obvious impacts that demonstrate the logical inconsistency of 
the government’s proposals. For example, at a time when the govern-
ment is otherwise trying to reduce the number of asylum claims in the 
United Kingdom, the cuts will likely increase the number of asylum 
claims because seeking asylum will be one of the only government-
funded ways to seek to remain in the country.112 The consequences of 
this development are significant, and go beyond an obviously increased 
judicial caseload.113 Many of the litigants in these cases will be unrepre-
sented, putting even greater pressure on limited judicial resources.114 
Moreover, lawyers predict that many of these cases are likely to be of 
questionable merit, which will heighten public hostility toward refugees 
generally.115 As one lawyer put it, the “panic” over asylum-seekers will 
                                                                                                                      
107 Interview with Interviewee UK-114, in London, Eng. (Nov. 22, 2012); Telephone 
Interview with Interviewee UK-113 (Nov. 9, 2012); Interview with Interviewee UK-108, 
supra note 68. 
108 See Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107; Telephone Interview with 
Interviewee UK-113, supra note 107; Interview with Interviewee UK-120, in London, Eng. 
(Nov. 6, 2012); Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68. 
109 Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68. 
110 See id. 
111 Interview with Interviewee UK-115, in London, Eng. (Nov. 2, 2012). 
112 See Memorandum from Steve Symonds, supra note 103; Interview with Interviewee 
UK-114, supra note 107. 
113 See Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107. 
114 See id.; Interview with Interviewee UK-120, supra note 108. 
115 See Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107 (discussing how using Refu-
gee Act claims as a way to get legal aid can pollute perceptions of the system); Interview 
with Interviewee UK-118, in London, Eng. (Oct. 18, 2012) (noting that citing directly to 
treaty provisions can be difficult). 
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return.116 Another lawyer indicated that the rise in such cases will im-
pair the reputation of lawyers, who will be viewed as litigating baseless 
claims.117 Finally, one lawyer who frequently represents the state in asy-
lum cases felt that the impending changes will hurt government lawyers 
because a lack of funding for most immigration-related matters will 
mean that solicitors who later represent the government in refugee 
cases will no longer acquire experience doing a range of immigration 
work, making them less effective.118 
 Viewed within the frame of globalization, the legal aid cuts are an 
extremely effective means of reasserting state power over migration and 
counteracting the encroachment of international norms. By limiting 
immigrants’ ability to obtain counsel in Article 8 proceedings, for ex-
ample, the government diminishes lawyers’ opportunities to pressure 
courts to expand the influence of international human rights treaties 
within U.K. jurisprudence.119 
VI. Response of Cause Lawyers to the Reassertion of State 
Power over Asylum 
 At the same time that the United Kingdom has taken the steps de-
scribed above to make the right to asylum more difficult to assert and 
asylum itself more difficult to obtain, refugee lawyers have sought to 
increase their clients’ likelihood of obtaining asylum by expanding the 
application of international norms to individual asylum cases.120 They 
have pursued two interrelated strategies in doing so: advocating for 
complementary human rights protections for their clients and exploit-
ing the increasingly global perspective of the U.K. judiciary. Each of 
these strategies is discussed below. 
A. Complementary Human Rights Protections 
 One of the strategies most consistently articulated by lawyers inter-
viewed is infusing their advocacy with human rights arguments beyond 
                                                                                                                      
116 See Interview with Interviewee UK-107, in London, Eng. (Sept. 7, 2012). 
117 Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107. Not all lawyers felt that the ef-
fect of the cuts would be uniformly adverse to asylum-seekers. One thought that the cuts 
would weed out some of the less skilled laywers representing refugees. Interview with In-
terviewee UK-115, supra note 111. Another predicted that some of the more skilled lawyers 
will become Tribunal judges, thus improving asylum jurisprudence overall. See Interview 
with Interviewee UK-120, supra note 108. 
118 Interview with Interviewee UK-119, in London, Eng. (Nov. 2, 2012). 
119 See Maiman, supra note 4, at 411–12. 
120 See infra text accompanying notes 129–165. 
1140 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
the Refugee Convention and the ECHR.121 These arguments fall under 
the general rubric of complementary protection, which offers broader 
protections than the Refugee Convention and, in some cases, the 
ECHR.122 Refugee lawyers thus seek to expand the ways that their cli-
ents might be able to remain in the United Kingdom by arguing that 
they are protected by treaties which the United Kingdom has ratified 
but not formally incorporated into domestic law. The most frequently 
mentioned treaty in this regard is the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), which obligates states parties to ensure that, in all actions 
taken by public officials involving children, the best interests of the 
child shall be a “primary consideration.”123 Moreover, the CRC requires 
states parties to ensure that children are not separated from their par-
ents against their will.124 Accordingly, the CRC offers broader protec-
tions to asylum-seekers than either the Refugee Convention or the 
ECHR.125 The CRC also offers further protections by recognizing the 
social and economic rights of children and the right of children to par-
ticipate in judicial proceedings, both of which are absent from the Ref-
ugee Convention and the ECHR.126 
                                                                                                                      
 
121 See Interview with Interviewee UK-118, supra note 115; Interview with Interviewee 
UK-106, supra note 50; Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-101, supra note 102; In-
terview with Interviewee UK-107, supra note 116. 
122 See McAdam, supra note 47, at 1–2. 
123 CRC, supra note 15, art. 3(1) (“In all actions concerning children, whether under-
taken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authori-
ties or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”). 
124 Id. art. 9(1) (“States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his 
or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial 
review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation 
is necessary for the best interests of the child.”). 
125 McAdam, supra note 47, at 173–74. The CRC has received judicial imprimatur in 
several countries, including Denmark, Finland, Canada, Australia, and the United States. 
See id. at 183–94; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Unaccompanied Refugee Minors: The Role and Place of 
International Law in the Pursuit of Durable Solutions, 3 Int’l J. Children’s Rts. 405, 405–06 
(1995). 
126 CRC, supra note 15, art. 4 (“With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States 
Parties shall undertake [implementing] measures to the maximum extent of their available 
resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation.”). Article 
12 of the CRC states, in full: 
 1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or 
her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting 
the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with 
the age and maturity of the child. 
 2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportu-
nity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the 
child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a 
manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
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 There is a concerted effort among many U.K. refugee lawyers to 
bring cases under the CRC in order to give meaning to the term “best 
interests of the child.”127 One of the most frequently articulated such 
arguments is that the deportation of the parent of a U.K.-based child 
will violate the United Kingdom’s obligations under the CRC, even 
where the parent does not have a valid asylum claim.128 Another more 
nascent argument is that the CRC protects the public rights of chil-
dren—not simply their private rights—and thus would prevent them 
from being returned to a country where generalized violence prevails, 
even if the child has not been individually targeted for persecution.129 
 Lawyers’ efforts to incorporate the CRC into their advocacy re-
ceived a huge boost with the 2011 decision in ZH (Tanzania) v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department,130 in which the U.K. Supreme Court cit-
ed to the CRC when holding that courts must consider the best inter-
ests of the child in cases involving removal of non-citizens (including 
those concerning asylum applicants).131 This Supreme Court imprima-
tur on the CRC has been critical to the U.K. judiciary’s acceptance of 
human rights treaties beyond the Refugee Convention and the 
ECHR.132 As one lawyer put it, “[ZH (Tanzania)] really blew open the 
jurisprudence on the rights of the child, the best interests of the 
child.”133 Another lawyer echoed this sentiment: “The [CRC] is very 
important . . . courts have taken judicial notice of it, but it also becomes 
a hardened legal standard by being incorporated into interpretation of 
Article 8.”134 
 One indicator of the importance of ZH (Tanzania) in reasserting 
the importance of international norms in asylum adjudication is the 
statement of a refugee lawyer who was interviewed for this Article in 
                                                                                                                      
Id. art. 12. 
127 See ZH (Tanzania) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2011] UKSC 4, [5]–[13] 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (noting explicitly appellant’s reliance on CRC and the question 
of what is in the child’s best interest). 
128 See id. at [11]–[13]. 
129 Interview with Interviewee UK-105, supra note 59. 
130 See ZH (Tanzania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [23]. 
131 As noted above, in addition to the CRC, the decision in ZH (Tanzania) was based on 
section 55 of the U.K. Borders, Citizenship, and Immigration Act of 2009, which requires 
the Secretary of State’s duties to be discharged in ways that safeguard and promote the 
welfare of children in the United Kingdom. See supra note 16. ZH (Tanzania) was the first 
case where section 55 (as well as the CRC) received such judicial imprimatur. See ZH (Tan-
zania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [24]. 
132 See Interview with Interviewee UK-107, supra note 116. 
133 Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68. 
134 Interview with Interviewee UK-107, supra note 116. 
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2010, prior to the decision in ZH (Tanzania). This lawyer noted the iro-
ny of the way that the adoption of the ECHR, through passage of the 
HRA, had subsequently been counterbalanced by a reduction in com-
plementary protection through other international human rights in-
struments: 
Oddly, at the same time as the Human Rights Act started to 
. . . bite, you end up getting less complementary protection 
granted because the government decides that they are wor-
ried about the numbers coming and tries to bear down on 
protection standards as a result . . . . They couldn’t go below 
the human rights standards contained in the [Human Rights] 
Act. But you’ve also seen a sort of diminution of complemen-
tary protection based on discretion, based on compassion, 
based on other humanitarian ideals and objectives.135 
ZH (Tanzania) has, for the moment at least, stemmed this diminution of 
complementary protections.136 Although it is still early to determine 
with any certainty the long-term impact of ZH (Tanzania) on asylum ju-
risprudence, it has certainly aided lawyers’ efforts to apply complemen-
tary international norms to domestic law in the United Kingdom.137 As 
a result, judges will be forced to at least address the issue of whether— 
and how—these norms apply in individual cases.138 Whether they do so 
in a way that generally aids asylum-seekers remains to be seen.139 
                                                                                                                      
 
135 Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-101, supra note 102. 
136 Other lawyers recently interviewed for this Article indicated that they have used 
other complementary protections in their advocacy, including the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107; Telephone Interview with Interviewee 
UK-111, supra note 87. See generally Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. However, none of these treaties has obtained as much accep-
tance within the judiciary as the CRC. 
137 In this way, the decision in ZH (Tanzania) is similar to that in Baker v. Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration, which established a similar precedent in Canada. See [1999] 2 SCR 
817, 860–62 (Can.). Since that opinion, Canadian refugee lawyers have frequently invoked 
the CRC in their advocacy, even though Canada has not formally incorporated the treaty 
into domestic law. See id. at 861; Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum Seek-
ers?: Canadian Refugee Jurisprudence and Practice Since 1990, at 11 (Minn. Legal Studies Re-
search, Paper No. 12-59, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164258. 
138 See ZH (Tanzania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [24]. 
139 Preliminary indications from the author’s ongoing research of published U.K. asy-
lum decisions indicate that arguments based on the CRC are, indeed, gaining traction. 
Based on a sample of fifty-eight reported decisions in the asylum tribunals and appellate 
courts between 1990 and 2012 in which the CRC was referenced in some way, there were 
no helpful references to the CRC (out of ten total references) prior to 2005, but twenty-
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 ZH (Tanzania) was the result of a legal strategy long practiced by 
cause lawyers in litigation: pushing the boundaries of precedent to es-
tablish revised standards that assist not only their clients, but a larger 
cause.140 In this case, that cause is the diffusion of international human 
rights norms.141 Lawyers interviewed for this Article described this pro-
cess in a variety of ways, in particular that of “educating” judges. For 
example, one lawyer noted, “I suppose if practitioners aren’t [articulat-
ing these laws] then we are not going to be able to educate the judici-
ary to take [the laws] into account.”142 Another said, “judges . . . wel-
come being shown how the EU Charter [which includes the ECHR and 
other human rights instruments] works and being taken kind of 
through the history of it a bit . . . it depends on the judge . . . . When 
you are arguing something different you get the judge’s attention.”143 A 
third said, “[You say to the judge] ‘I am going to tell you where the 
learning comes from [on that subject] . . . .’ It’s all about giving the 
judge comfort. If you want to do something quite interesting and crea-
tive, then you just give them comfort.”144 
 This strategy is not without risks, as an educational session might 
annoy a judge, particularly if she or he is not predisposed toward human 
rights arguments.145 Indeed, some lawyers identified circumstances 
where invoking treaty-based argument may actually hurt, rather than 
help, an asylum applicant.146 For example, one attorney stated that law-
yers who push such arguments at the Tribunal level, where—according 
to this lawyer—the judges do not like complicated law, might end up 
biasing the court against their client.147 Other lawyers noted, for exam-
ple, that “[p]eople feel they have to throw everything in . . . . I’ve sat at 
the back of the courts lots of times and watched judges say ‘what does 
this add to your argument?’ Why be put in that position?”148 Another 
                                                                                                                      
two helpful references (out of forty-eight total references) between 2005 and the present. 
For these purposes, “helpful” references occur when the CRC either (1) was the basis of a 
grant of asylum or other form of relief from removal, or (2) buttressed a decision in favor 
of the applicant that the court or tribunal reached on other grounds (such as the Refugee 
Convention). Thus, the number of helpful references to the CRC has expanded consid-
erably since 2005. 
140 See Scheingold & Sarat, supra note 40, at 13–14. 
141 See id. at 14. 
142 Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-102 (Oct. 18, 2010). 
143 Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-113, supra note 107. 
144 Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107. 
145 See Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68. 
146 See Interview with Interviewee UK-120, supra note 108. 
147 Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68. 
148 Interview with Interviewee UK-120, supra note 108. 
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noted that such a move can be counterproductive “if it highlights the 
lack of provision in the Convention that you could rely on directly.”149 A 
third agreed, saying, “If you try to rely on too many grounds, at times 
you undermine one by making progress with another.”150 
 These reactions suggest that invoking human-rights-based argu-
ment may not be the win-win situation many cause lawyers assume (i.e., 
that it will help both their clients and the larger cause of general accep-
tance of human rights norms applicable to asylum claims). In some 
cases, it can both hurt the cause of human rights generally, as well as 
the immediate interests of the client.151 
 Such risks, however, have not deterred most U.K. refugee lawyers 
from pursuing a long-term strategy of pushing for greater understand-
ing and acceptance of complementary protections for asylum-seekers.152 
Cases like ZH (Tanzania) prove the wisdom of this strategy and fuel simi-
lar efforts.153 Litigation over such matters is likely to be at the forefront 
of the struggle over the proper role of international norms in U.K. asy-
lum jurisprudence and policy for the foreseeable future.154 
B. Playing to the Global Judicial Stage 
 A related strategy for expanding the scope of international norms 
in U.K. refugee law is exploiting the globalization of human rights ju-
risprudence.155 As Anne-Marie Slaughter has noted, courts in many 
countries often look to the human rights jurisprudence of other na-
tions for guidance because they are relying on a core of international 
agreements.156 An attorney interviewed for this Article indicated that 
U.K. judges who rule on asylum cases are “aware that they make law for 
the whole world.”157 Other lawyers welcomed this development, noting 
that it has resulted in a more serious consideration of human rights 
arguments in asylum jurisprudence. For example, one said: “My sense 
is that the higher up you go the much more conscious the court is of its 
international influence. And I think it is a good thing because it makes 
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the whole endeavor much more serious.”158 Another noted: “[You tell 
the judge] you are on the right side of global attitudes and global 
thinking . . . . This is where the thinking globally is going . . . . [Judges] 
like to think of themselves as being on the right side of global devel-
opments.”159 
 These comments suggest yet another way that globalization has 
eroded state authority over refugee matters. Judges deciding cases in 
this area may be at least as beholden to international forces, including 
jurists, lawyers, and scholars from other countries, as they are to state 
actors within the country where they sit.160 Their international audi-
ence may create subtle pressures leading them to adopt a more inter-
national, rather than domestic, perspective when deciding asylum cas-
es.161 Many refugee lawyers are aware of this phenomenon and seek to 
use it to their clients’ advantage.162 
Conclusions 
 This Article’s empirical findings advance the two areas of socio-
legal scholarship which formed its framework. 
A. Devolution of State Power via Globalization 
 As numerous scholars have observed, globalization has created a 
power vacuum in many areas of civil society, including commerce, 
trade, and finance.163 On the other hand, despite the increased influ-
ence of international norms throughout the world, individual states 
continue to assert significant power over immigration law and policy.164 
States maintain this power in two ways, which we might think of as bad 
cop-good cop behavior.165 In the role of bad cop, the state takes steps to 
limit the number of asylum-seekers and refugees within its borders.166 
In the United Kingdom, these steps have included increased penalties 
for those who transport refugees into the country, ever-changing pro-
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cedural rules that make it more difficult to meet the standard for asy-
lum, and greatly reduced legal aid funding.167 In the role of good cop, 
the state adopts international human rights standards, thus broadening 
the forms of protection available to refugees under domestic (rather 
than international) law.168 In the case of the United Kingdom, these 
forms of adoption include effective incorporation of the ECHR into 
domestic law through the HRA, transposition into U.K. domestic law of 
the EU Qualification Directive on uniform asylum procedures, passage 
of section 55 of the U.K. Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 
2009, and the Supreme Court decision in ZH (Tanzania), which pro-
vided judicial imprimatur on the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.169 
 Thus, rather than cede power to global forces—as is the case with 
other areas of state policy described in the globalization literature—in 
the migration context states either fight to retain power (the bad cop) 
or co-opt it by adopting international norms (the good cop). This re-
sults in mixed messages from different state actors, as they give with 
one hand (incorporating the ECHR) and take away with the other (le-
gal aid cuts). 
 Refugee lawyers have a strong influence on this process, particu-
larly in encouraging courts to adopt international human rights stan-
dards into domestic law through judicial precedent.170 For without such 
influences it appears that many judges are likely to rely only on domes-
tic interpretations of international law.171 The advocacy of many U.K. 
refugee lawyers for complementary protection under unincorporated 
treaties like the CRC, however, effectively forces judges to deal with in-
ternational arguments and, at least in some cases—like ZH (Tanzania)— 
accept them.172 
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B. Cause Lawyering 
 This Article provides evidence justifying a slight modification to 
one of the primary tenets of the cause lawyering literature, namely that 
cause lawyering is frustrated under a “frightened government” which 
resorts to restrictive measures to regain control.173 It is fair to character-
ize the U.K. government’s response to increased immigration flows 
over the past fifteen years as one of fear, i.e., fear of losing control of 
the nation’s borders.174 However, this Article demonstrates that despite 
the desperate measures taken by the government to curb the influx of 
asylum-seekers, cause lawyers representing asylum-seekers are not com-
pletely frustrated in their attempts to provide protection for their cli-
ents.175 Indeed, compared to a study of such lawyers less than a decade 
ago, today’s refugee lawyers are far more optimistic.176 
 This ray of hope for cause lawyers has been brought about by an 
intriguing combination of domestic law and international human 
rights norms, which have enabled lawyers to broaden the parameters of 
asylum law protection beyond that which state law affords.177 Accord-
ingly, one corollary to this core tenet of cause lawyering is that when 
the forces against which state power is aligned are international in na-
ture (e.g., international human rights norms), cause lawyering may not 
flourish, but it certainly is not frustrated.178 At least in the United King-
dom, cause lawyers use those norms to keep pushing the boundaries of 
domestic resistance, confident—or at least hopeful—that they will 
eventually experience breakthroughs like ZH (Tanzania).179 Such break-
throughs take time, as the education of judges proceeds slowly, usually 
through a series of preliminary cases which may be unsuccessful.180 
 Another modification to this fundamental principle is that the 
government should not be seen as monolithic when it comes to being 
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frus-
ate
, 
provided that power is based on international human rights norms.186 
                                                                                                                     
frightened.181 In a tripartite government, one branch might be less 
fearful than another, more open to social change, or less apprehensive 
about public opinion.182 To that extent, cause lawyers engaging with 
the less fearful branch (the judiciary, in the United Kingdom) can 
flourish, while those who engage with more fearful branches (the U.K. 
executive, and in particular the Home Office) will likely be 
tr d.183 
 In the final analysis, refugee lawyers in the United Kingdom are 
not resisting state power over migration as much as trying to redefine 
it; that is, they seek to modify the sources on which that power is 
based.184 In the globalization context, they endeavor to fill the power 
vacuum in the new global legal order by pressuring the state (through 
its courts) to not only broaden human rights-based protections for ref-
ugees but to make those protections part of domestic law.185 In this way, 
cause lawyers are proponents of expanded state power over migration
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